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Abstract 
This study examined the determinants of trust in artificial intelligence (AI) in the area of asset management. Many 
studies of risk perception have found that value similarity determines trust in risk managers. Some studies have 
demonstrated that value similarity also influences trust in AI. AI is currently employed in a diverse range of 
domains, including asset management. However, little is known about the factors that influence trust in asset 
management-related AI. We developed an investment game and examined whether shared investing strategy with 
an AI advisor increased the participants’ trust in the AI. In this study, questionnaire data were analyzed (n=101), 
and it was revealed that shared investing strategy had no significant effect on the participants’ trust in AI. In 
addition, it had no effect on behavioral trust. Perceived ability had significantly positive effects on both subjective 
and behavioral trust. This paper also discusses the empirical implications of the findings. 
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Introduction 
 
The development of artificial intelligence (AI) is remarkable 
in diverse domains. Asset management is one of the most 
promising domains for AI application. Financial advisors 
with AI can more quickly provide their customers with asset 
management advice than those without AI (Komeichi & 
Nagaya, 2017). Then, what factors promote the practical 
application of AI in asset management? Many researchers 
have argued that trust plays an important role in imple- 
menting AI (Alaiad & Zhou, 2014; Benbasat & Wang, 2005; 
Lee & See, 2004). The next question, then, would be what 
determines trust in AI. 
Earle & Cvetkovich (1995) proposed the salient value 
similarity (SVS) model, stating that people are more likely to 
trust in other people when they share each other’s values. 
The SVS model has two key components: “salient values,” 
 
meaning that specific values are important in a particular 
situation, and “value similarity,” meaning that the trustor 
and trustee share salient values. Many studies on risk 
perception have shown that value similarity promotes trust 
in others and institutions (Nakayachi & Cvetkovich, 2010; 
Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Siegrist, Cvetkovich, & Roth, 
2000). 
Additionally, several studies have found that value simi- 
larity determines trust in AI. Verberne, Ham, & Midden 
(2012) revealed that autonomous cars that shared the user’s 
driving goals were more trustworthy than those that did not 
share such goals. Yokoi & Nakayachi (2018) found that 
shared policy of medical treatment enhanced participants’ 
trust in AI. These findings suggest that value similarity 
increases trust not only in people and institutions, but also 
in AI. Although these studies measured subjective trust, 
they did not measure behavioral trust. In addition, they 
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lacked the sources to discuss practical implications. We 
measured behavioral trust in addition to subjective trust for 
more significant practical implications.
This study examines the robustness of the findings that 
value similarity determines trust in AI in autonomous cars 
and medical care, and attempts to extend the generalizability 
of the findings to asset management. Subjective trust is 
measured to test generalizability, and behavioral trust is 
measured to discuss a practical implication. We operationally 
define value similarity as shared investing strategy, and 
hypothesize that individuals will trust more in AI when 
they share same investing strategy with the AI than when 
they do not. The participants in this study played an original 
investment game that we developed to test this hypothesis.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
We identified the ideal sample size using G*power3.1 with 
D-error level of .05, desired power of .80, and Kp² of .0731). 
The results of the power analysis indicated a minimum 
sample size of 102 participants. As a result of our recruit-
ment, one hundred and one students at a university in 
the Kansai region (26 males and 75 females; age M=20.2 
years, SD=0.94 years) participated in the experiment. 
We manipulated shared investing strategy (two conditions: 
shared versus unshared) as a between-subjects factor. The 
dependent variable was trust in AI.
Investment Game
Participants played the investment game using a personal 
computer. They earned as many points as possible by 
investing points in companies that would start a new 
business. They first selected one investing strategy they 
strongly preferred from two options: large investment or 
small investment (Figure S1, see Online Appendix). We 
then allocated the participants randomly to one of two 
conditions: the shared condition with AI and the unshared 
condition with AI. In the former, the AI had a tendency to 
recommend the participant’s preferred investing strategy, 
and in the latter the AI had a tendency to recommend the 
investing strategy that the participants did not prefer. 
Participants started with 50 points as the initial assets 
(Figure S2, see Online Appendix) and were then presented 
with descriptions about a target company. After reading 
the descriptions, they pushed a button to see the AI’s 
recommended investing strategy. The participants then 
saw either the large investment (10 points) or the small 
investment (1 point) strategy and could choose one of the 
two; that is, they could go with the AI’s recommendation 
or the other option. Next, the participants received infor-
mation about whether the company’s business succeeded 
or not after their decision. If the business succeeded, 
participants gained double the points they invested. If the 
business failed, in contrast, they lost the points that they 
invested. If participants invested 10 points and the business 
succeeded, then they gained 20 points; if participants 
invested 1 point and the business failed, then they lost only 
1 point. We call these decision and outcome pairs good 
decisions. If participants invested 1 point and the business 
succeeded, then they gained only 2 points; if they invested 
10 points and the business failed, they lost 10 points. We 
call these pairs bad decisions. In addition to the information 
about the result of the business, participants were presented 
with information about whether the AI’s recommendation 
matched the participant’s preferred investing strategy, and 
whether the investing strategy that the AI recommended 
was a good decision or not. The session for a participant 
consisted of ten trials.
The AI in both the shared and unshared conditions were 
programed to make good decisions six times, meaning that 
the AI’s quality about the investment was equally controlled 
between the conditions2). The AI in the shared condition 
recommended the strategy that participants preferred eight 
times: five of which would result in a good decision and 
three of which would result in a bad decision. It also recom-
mended the strategy that the participants did not prefer 
1) The effect size (Kp²) was the average of effect sizes found by Verberne et al. (2012) and Yokoi & Nakayachi (2018).
2) In the preliminary experiment, we programed the AI to make good decision seven times. But the rate of trust in the 
questionnaire and the number of entrusting AI were largely high in both conditions (ceiling effect). Conversely, if the AI 
made a good decision five times, participants would suspect that the AI’s good decisions were just luck, resulting in a low 
rate of trust in both the conditions (floor effect). We therefore programed the AI to make a good decision six times to 
prevent the ceiling and floor effects.
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twice, where one would result in a good decision and the 
other would result in a bad decision. The AI in the unshared 
condition, on the other hand, recommended the strategy 
that participants did not prefer eight times and the partici-
pant’s preferred strategy twice. The decision quality was 
the same as in the shared condition. Tables S1 and S2 
illustrate the progress of the games for each condition 
respectively (see Online Appendix).
Participants performed an additional task (Figure S3, see 
Online Appendix) after finishing the ten trials. In this task, 
participants were instructed to invest an additional fifteen 
times and asked how many times they entrust the decision 
about investment to the AI. The game ended after deciding 
the number of entrusting the AI.
Measures
We used a questionnaire to measure the perceived value 
similarity as a manipulation check, with trust in AI as the 
dependent variable and perceived ability and integrity as 
covariates (Table S3, see Online Appendix), referring to 
items in Benbasat & Wang (2005) and Yokoi & Nakayachi 
(2018). A five-point Likert scale was used for all items in the 
questionnaire with a scale ranging from “1=do not agree at 
all” to “5=strongly agree.” We recorded the number times 
participants entrusted AI in the fifteen additional invest-
ments as a behavioral measure of trust.
Procedure
After entering the experiment room, the experimenter 
explained the experiment briefly to the participants and 
that they would receive a gift card (JPY 500) as a reward for 
participating in the experiment and cash as an additional 
reward. They then signed the consent form. The experi-
menter explained the exact rules of the investment game, 
and explained that the additional cash reward would depend 
on their performance in the investment game. The instruc-
tion aimed to make participants aware that entrusting AI 
could influence their interests. After finishing the game, par-
ticipants were asked to complete the questionnaire. Finally, 
they were thanked, given their rewards, and debriefed.
Results
We excluded the responses of one participant who crudely 
answered the questions, leaving the responses of one hundred 
participants for analysis. Table 1 shows the descriptive 
statistics by condition.
Manipulation check
The results of t-test revealed that participants in the shared 
condition had a significantly higher evaluation of perceived 
value similarity than in the unshared condition (t(98)=5.615, 
p<.001). This result indicated that our manipulation of shared 
investing strategy was successful3).
The number of entrusting AI in the additional task
The effect of shared investment strategy on the number of 
entrusting AI was tested using the General Linear Model 
(GLM) procedure. We assumed that the dependent variables 
followed a binomial distribution because it was discrete and 
its maximum value was 15. The explanatory variables were 
shared investing strategy, perceived ability, and perceived 
integrity. A dummy variable was used for shared investing 
strategy, coded as follows: 1=the shared condition and 0=the 
unshared condition. The results of the analysis showed that 
shared investing strategy did not have a significant effect 
on the number of entrusting AI (Table 2). Perceived ability 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
N Trust Value similarity Ability Integrity
The number  
of entrusting
Shared 49 3.27 (0.78) 3.01 (0.73) 3.10 (0.85) 3.48 (0.69) 8.96 (3.83)
Unshared 51 2.85 (0.67) 2.29 (0.55) 2.74 (0.65) 3.16 (0.63) 8.69 (4.50)
Values in brackets indicate standard deviations.
3) Although the manipulation check found a significant difference in the rate of perceived similarity between the two 
conditions, the rate in the shared condition was midpoint in the five-point Likert scale (3.01). Future research should 
resolve the problem of why the score of perceived similarity in the shared condition did not increase.
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significantly affected the number of entrusting AI, but 
perceived integrity did not.
Questionnaire measurement of trust
We conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with 
trust in AI as the dependent variable, shared investing 
strategy as the independent variable, and perceived ability 
and perceived integrity as covariates. The results showed 
that the effect of shared investing strategy on trust in AI 
was not significant (F(1, 99)=3.731, p=.056, Kp2=.037). 
Perceived ability had a significantly positive effect on trust 
in AI (F(1, 99)=10.601, p=.002, Kp2=.099), but perceived 
integrity did not (F(1, 99)=.223, p=.480, Kp2=.005).
Discussion
This study examines the robustness of the findings that 
value similarity determines trust in AI in the context of asset 
management. The results did not support the hypothesis.
The results of the questionnaire are not in line with 
findings from several prior studies (Verberne et al, 2012; 
Yokoi & Nakayachi, 2018) and fail to extend the generaliz-
ability of the effect of value similarity on trust in AI to the 
context of asset management. The effect of shared investing 
strategy was marginally significant. However, the size of the 
effect was small, leaving a possibility that shared investing 
strategy slightly enhances trust in AI. The results of the 
test for behavioral trust did not support our hypothesis, in 
addition to that of subjective trust. Shared investment 
strategy may not have a large effect on the adoption of AI in 
asset management because it had a small effect on subjec-
tive trust and did not have a significant effect on behavioral 
trust. If it does not influence adoption, AI should be pro-
grammed to recommend the best strategy for earning money, 
regardless of the sharing strategy with the trustor.
Why did shared strategy with AI not increase the trust 
score in the questionnaire and the number of entrusting AI? 
The two ad-hoc interpretations might be as follows. First, 
the most important goal for participants and the AI was to 
earn as many points as possible. The investment strategy 
was just a means to achieve this goal. Therefore, sharing 
the strategy was not a very important value for the partici-
pants. Even in the unshared condition, they shared the most 
salient values in the game. Accordingly, trust in AI might 
not differ between the two conditions. Yokoi & Nakayachi 
(2018) examined a policy of medical treatment to cure a 
disease, and their results also suggested that shared policy 
had a small effect. However, Verberne et al. (2012) focused 
on driving goals, and their results suggested that shared 
driving goal had a large effect. These findings indicated that 
the goal promotes trust in AI more than the means does. 
Second, the AI’s ability for investment might be a strong 
determinant of trust. In both conditions, the AI made a good 
decision six times. Perceived ability had significant effect 
on both subjective trust and behavioral trust. Because 
ability largely influenced trust in AI and the AI’s ability was 
equally controlled between the two conditions, the effect of 
shared investing strategy might not be significant.
It is important to mention the limitations of this study. 
The sample consisted of undergraduate students, who probably 
have less investing experience. Less-experienced investors 
will probably have different levels of trust in AI than will 
more experienced inventors. Future research should explore 
the effect of investing experience on trust in AI.
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